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A survey of 190 wine and table grape farmers in the Western Cape puts the average 
wage for farm labour at R928 per month in 2003 and R1123 per month in 2004. 
Output per worker has doubled since 1983. On farms with grape harvesters, labour is 
30 per cent more productive (48 ton/worker) than on farms where wine grapes are 
picked by hand (37 ton/worker). At 9.75 tons per worker, table grapes are four times as 
labour-intensive as wine grapes. Resident men dominate the workforce on wine farms, 
while the resident female workforce is 20 per cent larger than the resident male 
workforce on table grape farms. Seasonal workers contribute a third of labour in table 
grapes, and brokers less than ten per cent in either case. In a single-equation short-run 
Hicksian demand function, wage, output, capital levels and mechanisation intensities 
are highly significant determinants of employment. Higher wages decrease 
employment and larger output increases employment. More mechanisation, measured 
by the number of tractors used to produce a ton of fruit, raises labour intensity too. 
Grape harvesters could not be shown to reduce jobs. The ten per cent rise in the 
minimum wage planned for March 2005 could reduce employment by 3.3 per cent in 
the wine industry and 5.9 per cent in the table grape industry, but it is more likely 
that the wage increase will be offset against fewer benefits. The average expected 




Agriculture is shedding labour the world over. Lately, new legislation 
governing farm labour may have increased the rate at which jobs are lost in 
South Africa (Newman et al, 1997; South African Human Rights Commission, 
2003:62). Given the broad unemployment rate of close on 30 per cent (Klasen & 
Woolard, 1999), it is important to know the effect of the minimum wage on 
employment in every sector to which it applies. 
 
In 1970, agriculture employed 31 per cent of the economically active 
population in South Africa. In 2002, only 6 per cent of the economically active 
remain in agriculture (Department of Agriculture, 2004). Employment levels 
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have fallen steadily at 1.7 per cent per year since 1970. There is some evidence 
that the trend may have accelerated during the early 1990s. The Department of 
Labour (2001) reports that one in five farm workers lost their jobs between 
1990 and 1996. In contrast, Western Cape farms shed almost no jobs between 
1985 and 2002 in spite of real wages rising at 2.3 per cent per year over that 
period. 
 
The minimum wage was introduced at two levels in March 2003, the higher of 
which was binding for wine farmers (Conradie, 2004). Minimum wage laws 
per se do not create unemployment, but when binding, the extent of 
disemployment depends on the elasticity of labour demand, which is industry 
specific. Jobs are lost when the real wage grows faster than productivity or 
where relative factor costs favour mechanisation. Some production processes, 
such as fruit picking, are inherently less likely to be mechanised. This could 
partly explain why the Western Cape has lost fewer jobs than the rest of the 
country. It also suggests that the demand for farm labour in the province is 
relatively inelastic and that a binding minimum wage may cause fewer job 
losses here than elsewhere. 
 
Fallon and Lucas (1998:11) showed that wage elasticities for the non-farm 
sectors in South Africa range from extremely inelastic in tobacco (–0.06) and 
beverages (–0.18) to quite elastic in textiles (–0.98) and wearing apparel (–2.51). 
One of the few local estimates for agriculture places the wage elasticity for 
farm labour in KwaZulu-Natal on the elastic side at about –1.4 (Latt & 
Nieuwoudt, 1985). In the US corn belt, the demand for farm labour is inelastic 
(O’Donnell et al, 1999) while reported wage elasticities range from –0.32 in 
England and Wales to –0.79 in Scotland (Dickens et al, 1995). Errington et al 
(1997) confirm the inelastic demand for farm labour England and Wales with 
short-run elasticities of –0.12 and –0.20 and long-run elasticities of–0.43 and –
0.53. In South Africa, the overall wage elasticity for agriculture is estimated to 
be –0.59 (Balcombe et al, 2000), which is not unlike the estimate of –0.55 found 
for manufacturing (Fedderke & Mariotti, 2002). But Fallon and Lucas’s 
findings provide reasons to believe that within agriculture, estimates could 
vary dramatically from sector to sector. 
 
The results presented here, are specific to the wine and table grape industries. 
Data come from a two-wave panel of 80 wine farmers surveyed in August 
2003 and resurveyed in August 2004. In 2004, the survey was extended to 
include 40 table grape growers as well. Details of data collection and initial 
findings are discussed in Conradie (2004). The structure of the paper is simple: 




specification and section IV discusses the econometric results. The paper closes 
with a summary of estimates wage elasticities and their policy implications. 
 
2. Descriptive  statistics 
 
Selected descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. It is clear that wine grapes 
are different from table grapes in most respects. Wine farms are significantly 
larger in terms of output and fruit produced, although table grape operations 
employ more workers. Female farm workers and seasonal workers, of whom 
the majority are female, are more readily employed on table grape farms than 
on wine farms. On wine farms, regular men dominate (59% of the workforce), 
while table grape farms employ fewer regular men than regular women. 
Counter to popular belief (South African Human Rights Commission, 2003:43), 
women are employed in their own right on table grape farms, although not on 
wine farms. At 32 per cent, or 43.3 full-time labour equivalents, seasonal 
workers are an important part of the workforce on table grape farms. Seasonal 
workers are not important on wine farms. Labour provided by labour brokers 
comprises less than ten per cent of the workforce in both industries. The level 
of mechanisation, as measured by the number of tractors, is the same in both 
industries, but variable mechanisation cost, measured as the amount spent on 
fuel, is significantly higher on table grape farms than on wine farms.  
 






grape Entire  sample 
Variable Units  Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Std  dev  n 
Output ton  1393  1533  1036  1386  1120  188 
   wine grapes  % of crop  77  63  0.6  60  37  188 
   table grapes  % of crop  2  0.5  98  22  41  188 
Unit cost  R/ton  1511  1676  6255  2515  2309  161 
Employment  FTEs  33.7 34.8  118.6  52.1 80.8 190 
   resident men    19.2  19.5  29.6  21.5  17.0  190 
   wives of resident men    12.8  11.8  35.5  17.7  17.0  187 
   contract labour    2.9  2.8  11.8  4.6  21.0  188 
   seasonal workers    1.5  2.6  43.3  10.7  36.2  188 
Average wage  R/month  928  1035  1227  1039  346  181 
Labour  productivity  ton/FTE  41.8 43.9 9.75  36.1 20.5 188 
Tractors  number  5.9  6.0 6.8 6.2  4.3 188 
Tractor productivity  ton/tractor  228  243  157  219  105  188 
Grape  harvesters  number  0.40 0.37  NA  0.41 0.47  151 
Fuel R1000  72  67  159  92  116  173 
Fuel productivity  ton/R1000 
fuel 
21.5 21.9 9.6  19.1 10.4 171 
 
From August 2003 to August 2004, the wine industry saw some permanent 




significant at the five per cent level. In some cases, the change is due to a 
r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s a m e  i n d i v i d u a l s .  W i n e  f a r m s  u s e  m o r e  p e r m a n e n t  
labour than other agriculture in the Western Cape. The 2002 Agricultural 
Census reports an average workforce of 29 workers per farm for the Western 
Cape, and sets the contribution of part-time and seasonal workers at 55 per 
cent (StatsSA, 2004). 
 
The average wine farm in this sample produces 1140 tons of wine grapes and 
340 tons of other fruit, consisting mostly of fruit for canning. It is large and 
expensive compared to the industry average. According to SAWIS (2004) the 
average wine farm produces only 278 tons of grapes, and more than 80 per 
cent of wine farmers produce less than 500 tons per year. The difference is 
mostly due to what one regards as a ‘farm’. SAWIS counts producer numbers, 
or wine brands, while this survey counts operational units. In addition, wine 
making or fruit packing are included in the scope, and thus cost, of a farm, 
while VINPRO calculates unit cost of production from a list of grape growing 
activities. VINPRO estimates the average cost of production in this area to be 
about R760 per ton (Van Wyk, 2004). The average table grape farm produces 
1008 tons of table grapes and 28 tons of other fruit, including wine grapes and 
citrus. Unit cost of production is R2515 per ton for the sample as a whole, but 
is significantly higher in the table grape industry (R6255/ton) than in the wine 
industry (± R1550/ton). This is not surprising given that table grapes are 
packaged on the farm while most wine grapes are processed centrally. Table 
grape cost thus includes the cost of packing, cooling and shipping while cellar 
costs are only included for a small number of wine farms. Even if one includes 
the estimated processing costs of roughly R900 per ton (SAWIS, 2004), table 
grapes are still significantly more expensive to produce than wine grapes.  
 
The average wage on wine farms increased significantly from R925 per month 
in 2003 to R1035 per month in 2004. Table grape workers earn higher wages, 
on average R1227 per month in 2004. Average wage was calculated by 
dividing the total wage bill for the previous financial year by the number of 
workers employed in August of each year. According to the Census, the 
Western Cape’s average wage was R662 per month for all farm labour and 
R1149 per month for permanent labour in 2002 (StatsSA, 2004). Recalculated 
for the observed ratio of permanent to casual staff, the 2002 provincial average 
is R1053 per month, which is 19 per cent higher than the wage recorded here.  
 
Labour productivity, measured in tons of fruit produced per full-time labour 
equivalent, is four times higher on wine farms (± 43 ton/FTE) than on table 




five per cent in 2004. In 1983, the average product of labour in the study area 
(statistical region 8) was 20 tons per worker (StatsSA, 1987).  
 
Wine grapes are different from most other fruit insofar as they can be picked 
by machine, making capital and labour direct substitutes in this case. There is 
a claim that grape picking machines could reduce a wine farm’s harvest labour 
requirement from a hundred workers to two workers (Simbi & Aliber, 2000). 
In this survey, 35 per cent of respondents already own a grape picking 
machine and another 20 per cent rent a quarter of a machine on average. The 
capacities of these machines vary widely and part-time use is difficult to 
estimate accurately. However, the average labour productivity on farms with a 
grape harvester is 29  per cent higher (48 ton/FTE) than on farms where a 
grape harvester is not used (37 ton/FTE). As more farms adopt grape 
harvesters, labour productivity will rise, employment will most likely fall and 
real wages might increase.  
 
Tractors are the measure of mechanisation for which reliable data are easiest to 
collect. Fuel data, while more accurate (tractors can be idle), is more difficult to 
record accurately at the farm-level. The average farm has 6.2 tractors and 
spent R92  000 on fuel in the previous financial year. There is no statistical 
difference between the number of tractors on wine farms and table grape 
farms, but the average expenditure on fuel is significantly higher on table 
grape farms. Like labour productivity, tractor productivity is higher on wine 
farms (± 235 ton/tractor) than on table grape operations (157 ton/tractor). Fuel 
productivity is twice as high on wine farms as on table grape farms. 
 
3. Model  specification 
 
Economic theory usually assumes that prices (wages) and quantity 
(employment levels) are endogenous in competitive markets, but in the 
presence of minimum wages this may not be the case. The choice of model 
critically depends on the presence of simultaneity. If there is simultaneity, 
2SLS estimation is consistent and efficient while OLS is inconsistent. If on the 
other hand, there is no simultaneity, OLS is consistent and efficient while 2SLS 
is consistent but inefficient (Pindycke & Rubinfeld, 1998:353). Hausman’s 
specification test2 is used as a preliminary diagnostic before the models are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
                                                 




3.1  Determinants of labour demand 
 
In the simple neoclassical model of profit maximisation, a firm produces 
output by choosing optimal combinations of capital and labour to maximise 
profits. The short-run cost function is a constrained version of profit 
maximisation in which capital and output levels are held constant.  
 
) , , ( y K w C C =  
 
By Shephard’s lemma, the conditional labour demand function is the partial 
derivative of the short-run cost function with respect to wage. The basic 
estimating equation is obtained by taking the natural logarithms: 
 




empl  employment in full time labour equivalents  
wage  average nominal wage calculated from previous year’s wage bill 
and current full-time equivalent employment 
output  size of the harvest in tons 
u  stochastic error term  
 
A higher wage is expected to reduce employment and higher output to 
increase employment. Given the double log specification, the coefficient on 
wage can be read off directly as a short-run Hicksian wage elasticity 
(Errington et al, 1997).  
 
Capital level is proxied by expenditure on fuel and the presence of certain 
labour-saving equipment such as grape harvesters. 
 
fuel  fuel expenditure in R1000 
gh  number of grape picking machines used (owned and rented)  
 
If one believes that capital and labour are substitutes in production, the a priori 
expectation on fuel is negative, but several authors have found that capital and 
labour are complements (Latt & Nieuwoudt, 1985; O’Donnell et al, 1999; 
Fedderke & Mariotti, 2002). This suggests that production on some farms (and 
firms more generally) is more intensive than on others; those farms that use 
more labour also use more machines. Nevertheless, the a priori expectation 
about the coefficient on gh is still negative since these machines directly save 





Picking up on the idea of intensity of production, the following capital 
productivity variable is defined: 
tracton  number of tractors ÷ output 
Tracton measures the intensity of mechanisation independent of farm size. The 
expected sign is positive since firms that have high machine productivity will 
also have high labour productivity and vice versa. 
 
Theoretically one expects unique labour demand functions for each of the 
products produced. A crop dummy allows one to separate table grapes from 
wine grapes. A positive coefficient would indicate that table grapes are more 
labour intensive than wine grapes. 
cropd  crop dummy, 1 = table grapes and 0 = wine grapes 
Cash wages are not the only cost of employment. Farm workers in the study 
area receive extensive free benefits which are not accurately quantified. 
Benefits are expected to reduce employment since they increase the cost of 
employment. The provision of free electricity is used to proxy all benefits. 
electricity  1 = free electricity provided, 0.5 = electricity subsidized,  
0 = workers pay for electricity 
Crop type and mechanical grape picking, as captured by grape harvesters, 
potentially affect wage elasticity. There is no a priori expectation regarding the 
sign of the interaction between cropd and lnwage. According to the Hicks-
Marshall rules of elasticity (Hicks, 1932:242), demand should be more elastic 
where the wage bill contributes a larger portion of total costs (table grapes) 
and more elastic where the technology permits input substitution (wine 
grapes). The interaction between gh and lnwage is expected to have a negative 
coefficient, since the opportunity to substitute a machine for workers is greater 
on farms where grape harvesters are used. 
 
Finally, it is possible that the demand for certain kinds of labour is more elastic 
than for other kinds. To this end, four additional employment variables were 
defined: 
men  regular men with headcount = 1 FTE 
women  the wives of regular men with headcount adjusted for actual hours 
seas  mostly picking labour recruited by the farmer in FTE 
broker  labour provided by a third party in FTE 




Insofar as resident men are the dominant source of labour, one expects the 
demand for their labour to be less elastic than for that of women who often 
have only casual status in the eyes of many farmers (Conradie, 2004). There is 
no obvious expectation with regards to the elasticity of seasonal and contract 
labour. If the farmer views casual labour as ‘extra’, the demand for its labour 
will be relatively elastic, but where farmers have replaced permanent staff 
with casual labour, demand should be no different. 
 
4. Results  and  discussion 
 
Labour demand on grape farms is generally inelastic. Results deteriorate in 
proportion to the share of a particular labour type in overall employment. 
Between 85 and 89 per cent of the variation in total employment (Table 3) is 
explained, while only about 80 per cent of the variation in the employment of 
permanent men (Table 4) could be explained. For the wives of regular men 
(Table 5), the overall fit drops to between 63 and 71 per cent, but in this model 
wage is no longer statistically significant at any reasonable level of confidence. 
In the models of the demand for seasonal workers (Table 6) about 64 per cent 
of the variation is explained, while the coefficient on wage is only significant at 
the 15 per cent level of confidence. 
 
According to Table 3, wage, farm size, fuel expenditure and mechanisation 
intensity are highly significant determinants of overall employment. 
Coefficients have the expected signs. A higher wage reduces employment and 
larger farms employ more people. This study confirms the result that firms 
using more machines also use more labour, since both lnfuel and tracton carry 
positive signs. Surprisingly, grape harvesters could not be shown to reduce 
overall employment, but table grape farmers employ significantly larger 
workforces than wine farmers. The coefficient on the interaction term of lnwage 
and cropd in Model 3 is not statistically significant at five per cent, implying 
that at the five per cent level of confidence there is no statistical difference in 
the wage elasticities for the two industries. However, if one is willing to accept 
the p-value of 0.079 for the interaction term, the demand for labour in table 
grape production (-0.59) is almost twice as elastic as the demand for labour on 
wine farms (-0.33). In Models 3 and 4 the Ramsey RESET tests (Gujarati, 
1995:465) fail to reject the null hypothesis that the models have no omitted 
variables, while Breusch-Pagan tests (Gujarati, 1995:379) fail to reject a 
constant variance hypothesis and White’s tests (Gujarati, 1995:379) fail to reject 
a null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
 




Table 3:  Demand for all workers 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dependent variable  ln(empl) ln(empl) ln(empl) ln(empl) 
ln(wage)  -0.312** -0.341** -0.334** -0.390** 
  (-3.64) (-5.20) (-4.94) (-6.51) 
ln(size)  0.556** 0.563** 0.570** 0.611** 
  (6.84) (7.03) (9.63) (9.86) 
ln(fuel)  0.423** 0.419** 0.339** 0.328** 
  (7.21) (7.23) (7.28) (7.05) 
ln(tracton)  0.274** 0.276** 0.281** 0.289** 
  (3.52) (3.55) (4.23) (4.34) 
cropd  dropped dropped  2.820**  1.036** 
     (2.79)  (16.37) 
cropd × ln(wage)  0.115** 0.116**  -0.255   
  (3.18) (3.20)  (-1.77)   
gh  0.397 -0.110     
  (0.41) (-1.73)     
gh × ln(wage)  -0.073     
  (-0.52)     
electricity  -0.213** -0.212** -0.187** -0.193** 
  (-4.15) (-4.15) (-3.88) (-4.00) 
constant  1.502*  1.676** 1.679** 2.067** 
  (2.49) (3.35) (3.33) (4.53) 
n  135 135 171 171 
adjusted R2  0.85 0.85 0.89 0.89 
Ramsey  RESET  2.58 2.65 1.58 1.67 
prob.  0.06 0.05 0.19 0.18 
Breusch-Pagan    4.32 4.27 1.15 0.34 
prob.  0.04 0.04 0.28 0.56 
White  51.39 47.52 35.46 34.48 
prob.  0.04 0.01 0.27 0.12 
T-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
According to Table 4, the demand for regular men is similar to the demand for 
total labour. Higher wages significantly reduce the number of permanent men 
employed and larger farms employ more regular men than smaller farms. 
Higher fuel spending and more intensive use of machines are associated with 
more employment. Again table grape farms employ more workers than wine 
grape operations, but this time the crop dummy and the cropd-lnwage 
interaction term are not significant at the five per cent level. To argue that the 
demand for regular men is more elastic on table grape farms (-0.44) than on 
wine grape farms (-0.20), one needs to accept a p-value of 0.146 on the 
interaction term. This is usually not done, but given the small number of table 
grape growers in the current sample, the data definitely suggest that demand 
for regular men in the two industries could be very different from each other. 
Benefits do not seem to affect the number of regular men employed and grape 
harvesters could not be shown to reduce employment. In Models 8 and 9 the 




omitted variables, while Breusch-Pagan tests fail to reject a constant variance 
hypothesis and White’s test fail to reject a null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
 
Table 4:  Demand for all permanent men 
Variable  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
Dependent variable  ln(men)  ln(men)  ln(men)  ln(men)  ln(men) 
ln(wage)  -0.150  -0.147  -0.209** -0.205** -0.258** 
  (-1.65) (-1.62) (-3.02) (-2.69) (-3.82) 
ln(size)  0.610** 0.591** 0.609** 0.612** 0.624** 
  (7.08) (7.06) (7.40) (8.82) (9.02) 
ln(fuel)  0.296** 0.305** 0.296** 0.224** 0.213** 
  (4.77) (4.98) (4.87) (4.27) (4.09) 
ln(tracton)  0.232** 0.219** 0.223** 0.248** 0.255** 
  (2.81) (2.69) (2.74) (3.31) (3.41) 
cropd  dropped dropped dropped  2.105  0.445** 
cropd × ln(wage)  0.073 0.075 0.075  -0.237   
  (1.91) (1.95) (1.95)  (-1.46)   
gh  1.114 1.086       
  (1.08) (1.05)       
gh × ln(wage)  -0.181 -0.176 -0.019     
  (-1.21) (-1.18) (-1.95)     
electricity  -0.051      
  (-0.93)      
constant  -0.354  -0.378  -0.012 0.308 0.667 
 (-0.56)  (-0.59)  (-0.02)  (0.54)  (1.30) 
n  135 135 135 171 171 
adjusted R2  0.82 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.79 
Ramsey  RESET 7.06 7.03 7.29 2.48 2.46 
prob.  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.06  0.06 
Breusch-Pagan   8.55 8.58 8.67 0.61 0.41 
prob.  0.004  0.0034 0.0032 0.43  0.52 
White  67.75 61.47 43.48 33.99 23.62 
prob.  0.0007 0.0002 0.0027 0.07  0.21 
T-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
Models of the demand for the labour supplied by the wives of regular men are 
presented in Table 5. While these models provide a reasonable fit, with 
significant coefficients on lnsize, lnfuel and lntracton, the coefficient on lnwage is 
not statistically different from zero at any reasonable level of significance for 
Models 10 to 13. Grape harvesters and the free benefits could not be shown to 
reduce the number of women employed, but the average table grape operation 
employs about four and a half more permanent women than the average wine 
farm. The Ramsey RESET tests on Models 12 and 13 fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no omitted variables and the results of the Breusch-Pagan and 
White tests indicate the absence of heteroskedasticity. Given that all variables 
in Model 13 are significant at the five per cent level, there is no reason to drop 
any of them, but since the majority of permanent women in the sample are 




wage elasticity from being estimated accurately. In Model 14 the interaction 
term is dropped, producing a statistically significant coefficient on lnwage of 
-0.195, which is similar to the wage elasticity estimated for their husbands. The 
result of Ramsey’s RESET test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no omitted 
variables and the results of the Breusch-Pagan and White tests again indicate 
the absence of heteroskedasticity for Model 14.  
 
Table 5:  Demand for labour supplied by the wives of regular men 
Variable  Model  10 Model  11 Model  12 Model  13 Model  14 
Dependent variable  ln(women)  ln(women)  ln(women)  ln(women)  ln(women) 
ln(wage)  -0.035 -0.035 -0.093 -0.078 -0.195* 
  (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.85) (-0.71) (-2.00) 
ln(size)  0.461** 0.461** 0.511** 0.491** 0.517** 
  (3.49) (3.49) (5.21) (5.02) (5.26) 
ln(fuel)  0.414** 0.414** 0.285** 0.294** 0.272** 
  (4.31) (4.31) (3.85) (3.99) (3.68) 
ln(tracton)  0.251  0.251*  0.290** 0.284** 0.298** 
  (1.96) (1.96) (2.74) (2.67) (2.78) 
cropd  dropped  dropped 4.175** 4.438** 0.944** 
     (2.63)  (2.79)  (9.62) 
cropd × ln(wage)  0.129* 0.129*  -0.468*  -0.500*   
  (2.22)  (2.22) (-2.06) (-2.20)   
gh  1.14      
  (0.72)      
gh × ln(wage)  -0.189  -0.024     
  (-0.82)  (-1.61)     
electricity  -0.213* -0.167* -0.124     
  (-2.02) (-2.02) (-1.62)     
constant  -0.793 -0.393 -0.101 -0.212  0.573 
  (-0.80) (-0.48) (-0.13) (-0.26)  (0.78) 
n  130 130 166 166 166 
adjusted R2  0.63 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Ramsey  RESET  2.60 2.51 0.38 0.31 0.23 
prob.  0.06 0.06 0.77 0.82 0.87 
Breusch-Pagan    0.53 0.57 0.03 0.16 0.03 
prob.  0.47 0.45 0.86 0.69 0.86 
White  37.86 24.83 19.92 15.38 13.98 
prob.  0.34 0.64 0.94 0.88 0.78 
T-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
The demand for seasonal labour in Table 6 is determined by the same 
variables as the demand for permanent labour, but a smaller sample size 
generally produces fewer significant coefficients. As expected, table grape 
farms employ significantly more seasonal workers than wine grapes, but in 
Model 19 lnsize, lntracton and lnfuel are not significant at the five per cent level. 
In Model 20, both lnsize and lntracton become significant at one per cent or 
better if lnfuel is dropped. The Ramsey RESET test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no omitted variables and for Model 20. Neither Model 19 nor 




use of grape harvesters do not affect the demand for seasonal workers. The 
wage elasticities in Models 19 and 20 are only significant at 12 and 11 per cent 
respectively, but they are almost double the wage elasticity for regular men. 
 
Table 6:  Demand for seasonal workers 
Variable  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  Model 18  Model 19  Model 20 
Depend variable  ln(seas) ln(seas) ln(seas) ln(seas) ln(seas) ln(seas) 
ln(wage)  -0.300 -0.247 -0.305 -0.502 -0.491 -0.485 
  (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.73) (-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.61) 
ln(size)  1.195* 1.185* 0.674* 0.711* 0.685* 0.942** 
  (2.17) (2.20) (2.33) (2.51) (2.42) (5.67) 
ln(fuel)  -0.206  -0.199 0.257 0.236 0.245   
  (-0.45)  (-0.44) (1.14) (1.07) (1.10)   
ln(tracton)  1.529* 1.528* 0.593  0.614 0.628 0.832** 
  (2.50) (2.53) (1.74) (1.81) (1.85) (2.87) 
cropd  dropped dropped  5.352  2.233**  2.234**  2.467** 
     (1.22)  (7.47)  (7.72)  (9.89) 
cropd×ln(wage)  0.120 0.119  -0.450       
  (0.71) (0.71)  (-0.71)       
gh  -1.124  -0.038      
  (-0.16)  (-0.08)      
gh × ln(wage)  0.159       
  (0.15)       
electricity  -0.394 -0.391 -0.256 -0.276     
  (-1.03) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-1.08)     
constant  3.878 3.545 0.562 1.845 1.861 2.073 
 (0.88)  (0.94)  (0.19)  (0.78) (0.78) (0.91) 
n  51 51 86 86 86 88 
adjusted R2  0.14 0.16 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 
Ramsey  RESET  0.87 0.93 1.31 1.20 1.49 1.39 
prob.  0.46 0.43 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.25 
Breusch-Pagan   0.38  0.38 3.89 3.59 3.83 3.64 
prob.  0.54 0.54 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
White  42.27 31.33 34.91 34.95 21.37 12.29 
prob.  0.19 0.30 0.29 0.19 0.32 0.50 
T-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
5. Wage  elasticities  and  their policy implications 
 
The estimated wage elasticities are summarised in Table 7. The demand for 
contract labour could not be estimated with a single equation model for the 
current sample. There are various reasons why this is the case. Firstly, labour 
brokers contribute a small share of total labour so that there is simply not 
enough data available at this point. In addition, labour brokers probably 
operate in a market where employment and wage are determined 
simultaneously. Furthermore, estimating the full-time equivalent labour 
provided by labour brokers require strong assumptions since farmers do not 
normally record the hours or days worked by contract labour. While the wives 




grape farms, collecting data on their employment was similarly challenging. 
Even regular women rarely work full-time, again requiring a whole range of 
assumptions to convert a body count into full-time equivalent employment. 
Finally, it is possible that not all employers view women in the same way. 
Some may actually employ women on charity principles rather than 
straightforward productivity grounds explaining why the relationship 
between employment and wage is noisier than for the other types of labour. 
The small number of observations for seasonal labour similarly hampered the 
estimation of industry specific wage elasticities. 
 
Table 7:  Wage elasticities by farm and labour type 
  Wine grapes  Table grapes 
All employment  -0.33  -0.59 
Regular men  -0.21  -0.44 
Wives of regular men  -0.20  -0.20 
Seasonal workers  -0.49  -0.49 
Contract labour  not estimated not  estimated 
 
The demand for labour on grape farms is inelastic. For overall labour demand, 
the wage elasticity in table grapes is similar to Balcombe et al’s (2000) estimate 
for agriculture as a whole, while the estimate for wine grapes is much lower. 
The industry differential is to be expected, since labour is a bigger cost item on 
table grape than on wine grape farms. For men, the industry differential is 
similar, but due to noisy data no industry differential could be established for 
women and seasonal workers. 
 
The most surprising result is that the wage elasticity for women on wine farms 
is of a similar magnitude as the wage elasticity for men. Many farmers 
consider the wives of regular men as casual labour only to be employed when 
“there is work”, usually during the harvest season. But almost in the same 
breath these farmers also talk of the need for both husband and wife to work 
in order to get by, and of wanting to keep money on the farm rather than pay 
it out to contract workers. Tied housing thus provides job security in an 
environment of rising real farm wages. As expected, the demand for seasonal 
workers is more elastic than the demand for regular workers. 
 
The proposed ten per cent wage increase scheduled for March 2005 will cause 
very few additional job losses, despite the current low inflation environment 
which causes most of the nominal increase to register as a real increase. First, 
the estimates in Table 7 are low. Even in the table grape industry, a ten per 
cent real wage increase would reduce employment only by six per cent at 
most. Second, farm workers still receive a significant portion of their wages in 




fewer benefits, the effective wage increase will be lower that the statutory 
increase. Seasonal workers will be more at risk than permanent staff, since 
they receive fewer benefits that can be offset against higher wages. 
 
From labour’s point of view, low wage elasticities are good news since it 
means that labour stands to benefit from higher minimum wages without 
facing proportional disemployment, at least in the short-run. In the wine and 
table grape industries, more people could be lifted out of poverty at a given 
minimum wage than would have been the case had the demand for labour 
been more elastic. 
 
To date, experience with the minimum wage has been in a positive product 
price environment for the wine industry. When product prices rise, employers 
find it relatively easy to meet statutory increases. If wine prices fall by 15 per 
cent, as it could this season, the increase in the minimum wage planned for 
March 2005, might meet with more resistance than have been observed so far. 
The strong Rand puts similar pressure on table grape farmers. 
 
Finally, demand for labour is derived from the demand for the product and is 
a function of production technology. These wage elasticity estimates for wine 
and table grapes are probably similar to those that apply in other tree fruit 
industries, but could be dramatically different from the wage elasticities that 
apply in field crops or livestock production. Given the importance of accurate 
estimates of wage elasticity in the process of setting minimum wage policy, it 
is essential to extend this kind of analysis to the other important agricultural 
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Hausman’s test of endogeneity 
 
The literature describes slightly different versions of Hausman’s specification 
test. Consider the following structural demand and supply equations for a 
labour market: 
 
Demand:  ei =α0 + α1 wi + α2 yi + α3 ci + u1i [1] 
 
Supply:  ei = α4 + α5 wi + α6 si + u2i  [2] 
 
The demand-side model is fairly standard: Employment (ei) is a function of the 
wage (wi), output (yi) and capital (ci) and a stochastic error term (u1i). Labour 
supplied (ei) is modelled as a function of wage (wi), the level of benefits 
provided (si) and a stochastic error term (u2i), rather than the usual alternative 
wage since the alternative wage would not vary across farms in the same 
district. 
 
The reduced form system of the structural equations above is: 
 
Wage:  wi = π0 +π1yi + π2ci + π3si + v1i [3] 
 
Employment  ei = π4 +π5yi + π6ci + π7si + v2i [4] 
 
In order to pick the right model to estimate labour demand, the question is if 
wi is correlated with u1i in equation [1] or not. Hausman’s null hypothesis is no 
simultaneity, in other words that wi is uncorrelated with u1i. If this hypothesis 
holds, OLS is consistent and efficient. Both Gujarati (1995:670) and Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1998:353) first regress wage on the exogenous variables and a 
range of instruments, that is, estimating [3]:  
 




i i i v w w 1 ˆ ˆ + =  [6] 
 
and then substitutes [6] into [1]: 
 
() i i i i i i u c y v w e 1 3 2 1 1 0 ˆ ˆ + + + + + = α α α α  [7] 




Gujarati (1995:670) estimates [7] directly, regressing employment on exogenous 
variables, the fitted wage and the fitted residual from the wage regression. 
According to Gujarati, Hausman’s null hypothesis requires a statistically 
insignificant coefficient on the fitted residual variable in [7]. 
 
P i n d y c k e  a n d  R u b i n f e l d  ( 1 9 9 8 :  3 5 3 )  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  [ 7 ] ,  b u t  
substitute [6] in again to be able to regress employment on wage (not wage-hat). 
 
()
() i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
u c y v w
u c y v v w
u c y v w e
1 3 2 1 1 1 1 0
1 3 2 1 1 1 1 0




+ + + − + + =
+ + + + − + =
+ + + + + =
α α α α α α
α α α α α
α α α α α
 [8] 
 
It is clear from [8] that the coefficient on the fitted residual should be zero if 
wage is exogenous to employment. Table 2 reports the results of Hausman’s 
specification test for the Pindyck and Rubinfeld version of the test. The t-tests 
on the fitted residuals fail to reject the assumption of independence between 
wage and employment in four out of five cases. Further analysis thus proceeds 
with OLS, except for brokers for which single equation estimation is not 











6 Table 2:  Results of Hausman’s specification test 
Dep variable  lnwage lnsize  lnfuel  lntracton  cropd  electricity  womeneq  funben  fitted  res c adj.  R2 
ln(wage)    -0.037 0.090  -0.048 0.217**  -0.037  -0.254  -0.066    6.74**  0.08 
    (-0.46) (1.42)  (-0.56) (2.71)  (-0.60) (-1.63) (-1.17)    (22.19)  
ln(empl)  -1.01**  0.572** 0.361** 0.280**  1.21**      0.677  6.27**  0.89 
  (-2.81) (9.00) (7.19) (3.94)  (12.11)        (1.86) (2.66)   
ln(men)  -0.304  0.633** 0.207** 0.304** 0.432**        0.077  1.22 0.78 
  (-0.78) (9.16) (3.79) (3.94) (3.97)        (0.20) (0.48)   
ln(women)  0.015  0.523** 0.262** 0.309** 0.898**        -0.216  -0.798  0.70 
  (0.03) (5.24) (3.33) (2.77) (5.72)        (-0.38)  (-0.22)   
ln(seas)  -1.015 0.651*  0.286 0.589 2.373**        0.567 5.315  0.63 
  (-0.51) (2.21) (1.12) (1.66) (4.72)        (0.28) (0.40)   
ln(broker)  3.83*  0.445 -0.309  0.494 -0.885      -4.27*  -28.1*  0.03 
  (2.31) (1.43)  (-1.24) (1.44)  (-1.87)        (-2.56)  (-2.58)   
T-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%    
 
 
 